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THE REAL ETIIlC OF DEATH AND DYING 
Norman L. Cantor* 
RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH. By Peter Singer. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 1994. Pp. 256. $22.95. 
When medical science became capable of prolonging the dying 
process beyond the point that most patients would wish, medical 
management of the dying process became a necessity. Health-care 
providers no longer could strive inexorably to extend waning 
human lives. The search thus began for an ethic to govern medical 
management of the dying process.1 
Peter Singer's Rethinking Life and Death,2 a provocative and 
entertaining book, purports both to critique "the old ethic" - the 
book is subtitled "The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics" - and 
to propound a "new ethic" to regulate the medical handling of dy-
ing patients.3 Although the book does underscore some anomalies 
in end-of-life care, its account of the dominant ethic of death and 
dying proves inaccurate. Rather than portraying the existing order 
- or disorder - it creates a straw man. Moreover, despite the 
highly problematic nature of his "new ethic," Singer defends it only 
superficially. 
This review essay contains three parts. The first exposes the de-
ficiencies in Singer's depiction of the old ethic. The second lays 
bare the key ingredients in his new ethic and discusses some of its 
major issues and weaknesses. The third presents my own prescrip-
tion for an appropriate ethic to govern medical management of the 
dying process. 
* Professor of Law and Justice Nathan L. Jacobs Scholar, Rutgers University School of 
Law. A.B. 1964, Princeton; J.D. 1967, Columbia. - Ed. 
1. For description of diverse ethical theories suggested for the field of bioethics in gen-
eral, and the death-and-dying context in particular, see ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. 
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 44-111 (4th ed. 1994); THOMAS A. MAPPES 
& DAVID DEGRAZIA, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 4-46 (4th ed. 1996); Susan M. Wolf, Shifting 
Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 
395 (1994). 
2. Peter Singer is a philosophy professor at Monash University in Australia and has writ-
ten extensively on animal rights and on bioethics topics such as reproductive technology and 
care of the dying. 
3. The book touches on an ethic toward fetal life and animal life as well as dying medical 
patients. Its focus, however, rests on the medical handling of human life. This essay centers 
on that feature. 
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I. THE OLD ETHIC AS STRAW MAN 
According to Singer, a "sanctity of life" ethic dominates the 
traditional approach to death and dying. A central premise of that 
supposed ethic is that all human beings, no matter how rudimentary 
their mental function and capacity, deserve protection. That pro-
tection includes a prohibition against the intentional taking of inno-
cent human life and, in the medical context, a ban on letting 
patients die4 simply because of deteriorated quality of life (pp. 73-
75). Exceptions to this sanctity-of-life approach supposedly exist to 
allow for the cessation of "extraordinary means of medical treat-
ment" and for the use of analgesics that are intended to relieve pain 
but incidentally hasten death (p. 147). However, the strict sanctity-
of-life ethic described by Singer has not prevailed in Anglo-
American jurisprudence since 1976, when the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in In re Quinlan5 upheld the discontinuation of life support 
maintaining a permanently unconscious patient. 
Singer contends that physicians who remove life-sustaining ma-
chinery with the object of allowing a patient to die take an innocent 
human life - a violation of what he sees as the old sanctity-of-life 
principle. In Singer's view, the medical profession secured authori-
zation to take such steps in the 1993 Bland6 case, in which Britain's 
House of Lords upheld the removal of a feeding tube sustaining a 
permanently unconscious patient (pp. 65-66). This assertion ig-
nores the fact that American courts for twenty years have upheld 
the right to remove life support, including artificial nutrition, from 
permanently unconscious patients even though the acting parties in-
volved understood that death would ensue. Quinlan was the first 
such decision,7 but a succession of cases from other jurisdictions 
have followed suit.a Singer attempts, unsuccessfully, to distinguish 
these American precedents as being grounded in autonomy - the 
prior expressions of now incompetent patients (p. 64). Quinlan did 
4. Singer contends that the existing whole-brain definition of death has "come apart." 
See p. 36. That contention rests principally on the fact that even after brain death - under 
current definitions - occurs, certain endocrinal or hormonal functions of the body continue 
for some period. See p. 36. Yet Singer does not articulate an alternative definition of death. 
Instead, he reformulates the concept of "personhood" and declares that the lives of "nonper-
sons" merit no legal protection. I critique that reformulation of personhood, a part of 
Singer's "new ethic," in Part II. 
5. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
6. Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, 2 W.L.R. 332 (C.A. 1993). 
7. Quinlan involved the withdrawal of a respirator, not artificial nutrition, and the patient 
surprisingly endured for nine years. Nonetheless, the firm medical expectation had been that 
withdrawal of the respirator would cause the prompt death of the patient. See Quinlan, 355 
A.2d 647. 
8. Justice Stevens's dissent in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 
348 n.21 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), contains a list of decisions so holding. For an analy-
sis of the judicial rationales employed in these cases, see Norman L. Cantor, The Permanently 
Unconscious Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 381 (1989). 
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not rely on the patient's prior expressions.9 Furthermore, subse-
quent decisions have endorsed the withdrawal of life support from 
patients even in the absence of clear-cut prior expressions.10 In 
short, American jurisprudence on death and dying generally ac-
cepts that physicians sometimes may "take innocent life," as Singer 
defines the concept. 
The second aspect of Singer's old sanctity-of-life ethic - the 
notion that poor quality of life can never justify the termination of 
life-sustaining medical intervention - never really has prevailed. 
Since 1976, American courts have recognized that a person's health 
may deteriorate to such a degree that she may be better off dead 
than alive.11 Cases have applied this principle to both competent 
and incompetent patients. For incompetent patients, judicial ac-
ceptance of end-of-life determinations has relied both on the dismal 
status of the patient - such as permanent unconsciousness - and 
on determinations that the burdens of existence, such as pain and 
suffering, can outweigh the benefits of extended life.12 Contrary to 
what Singer suggests, courts frequently consider diminished quality 
of life, in the sense of grievous bodily deterioration, in shaping the 
bounds of medical intervention in the dying process.13 
With regard to the asserted "old ethic," Singer suggests that per-
mitting the removal of "extraordinary means" of life preservation 
constitutes the main deviation from a strict sanctity-of-life principle 
(p. 188). The concept of extraordinary means, which originated in a 
1957 pronouncement of Pope Pius XII, 14 influenced the original po-
sition of the devoutly Catholic Quinlan family.1s In fact, the con-
cept sometimes was cited as a possible demarcation of permissible 
medical conduct in ending life-sustaining intervention. For exam-
9. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664. 
10. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 685-86 (Ariz. 1987); In re Drabick, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 840, 855-60 (cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 
716 (Ga. 1984); In re Jane Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992); Superintendent of 
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 
332 (Minn. 1984); In re Crum, 580 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio P. Ct. 1991); In re L.W. 482 N.W.2d 60, 
67 (Wis. 1992). 
11. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417; Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647; In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 
(Wash. 1987). 
12. See, e.g., In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1181-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 610 
N.E.2d 1264 (Ill. 1993); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985); Grant, 747 P.2d at 450-
51. 
13. In the context of assessing an incompetent patient's best interests, the quality-of-life 
consideration sometimes occurs under the heading of "dignity." See Norman L. Cantor, 
Quality of Life in Legal Perspective, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1361-66 (Warren T. 
Reich et al. eds., 1995). 
14. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 658. 
15. The family petitioned for removal of "all extraordinary means," by which they meant 
the patient's respirator, but not her antibiotic therapy or artificial nutrition. See In re 
Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806, 813 (N.J. Super. a. Ch. Div. 1975). 
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pie, the American Medical Association House of Delegates used 
the extraordinary means terminology in 1973 in suggesting guide-
lines for terminal care.16 
Nevertheless, American jurisprudence long since has aban-
doned the ordinary-extraordinary dichotomy.17 Authorization to 
withhold or withdraw life support now extends to the most basic 
forms of medical intervention, including blood transfusions,18 artifi-
cial nutrition,19 and chemotherapy.20 
In sum, the old ethic of death and dying presented by Singer 
bears little resemblance to the prevailing ethic found in American 
cases of the past twenty years. Had Singer articulated and de-
fended a sensible new direction in the death and dying ethic, that 
flaw would seem forgivable - but he did not. Although he does 
endorse some unconventional positions, he fails adequately to de-
fend or even to articulate their implications. I tum to consideration 
of those positions. 
Il. WEAKNESSES OF THE NEW ETHIC 
A. Human Nonpersons 
Singer's new ethic centers around the notion that not all human 
beings are persons (pp. 180-83). To be a "person," he says, a being 
must have an awareness of self over time and enough reasoning 
capacity to plan for the future (pp. 182, 218). Under this theory, 
certain human beings - including anencephalics, permanently veg-
etative patients, and neonates - are deemed nonpersons. On the 
other hand, certain nonhuman animals - including whales, dol-
phins, monkeys, dogs, and pigs - are deemed persons (pp. 180-82, 
205-06, 209-10). Although Singer does not address it, his frame-
work also might classify some severely retarded or demented 
human beings as nonpersons. This might include patients with ad-
vanced Alzheimer's, for example.21 
Singer's personhood framework falters in its superficial consid-
eration of the implications for human nonpersons. Many commen-
tators have argued that absence of neocortical function - which 
includes the capacity to interact with others - ought to form the 
16. See James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975). 
17. For a clear-cut repudiation of that dichotomy, see In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234-
35 (NJ. 1985); ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHI' TO DIE 481-86 (2d ed. 1995). 
18. See In re Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965). 
19. See In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992). 
20. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 
1977). 
21. Some of these beings have lost theii- sense of self over time, a factor critical to self-
identity and personhood under Singer's framework. 
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boundary of death.22 Singer does not, however, classify his nonper-
sons as dead. Rather, he sees them as creatures with diminished 
rights and expectations, retaining some ,interests but lacking normal 
protection against involuntary death (p. 198). 
Singer briefly considers the implications of nonpersonhood in 
the context of neonates. He supports medical infanticide, at the 
parents' discretion, during the first few weeks of a neonate's exist-
ence, asserting that these young infants are "not yet full members of 
the moral community" (p. 130). In his view, the parents of a 
Down's syndrome neonate may withhold her life support if they 
prefer to raise only children better equipped to deal with life's chal-
lenges (pp. 212-15). Singer does not discuss the concomitant issues 
of organ harvesting, medical experimentation, or allocation of 
scarce medical resources; however, it seems fair to assume that his 
theory would favor the interests of live persons over the interests of 
nonperson neonates in prospective life.23 
Singer's approach to the implications of nonpersonhood proves 
even more perfunctory in the context of permanently unconscious 
patients. Must we honor the request of a previously competent pa-
tient to be maintained in a permanently vegetative state? Singer 
says that such wishes should be "taken into account," but should 
not be decisive (p. 192). What about the independent emotional 
and financial interests of the patient's relatives and other caretak-
ers? Singer merely says that such interests "deserve consideration" 
(p. 192). What about the competing interests of potential organ re-
cipients and potential beneficiaries of nontherapeutic medical ex-
perimentation on the permanently unconscious patient? While 
Singer comments that we "cannot ignore the needs of others" 
(p. 192), he does little to elucidate a hierarchy of interests regarding 
the treatment of human nonpersons. 
Labelling permanently vegetative patients as nonpersons 
achieves very little. If Singer's concern is the indefinite preserva-
tion of a dismal quality of life - with no real benefit to the perma-
22. See John P. Lizza, Persons and Death: What's Metaphysically Wrong With Our Cur-
rent Statutory Definition of Death?, 18 J. MED. & PHIL. 351 (1993); David R. Smith, Legal 
Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 850 (1986); Robert M. Veatch, The 
Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of Death, HASTINGS CTR. REP. July-Aug. 
1993, at 18. No court has ever adopted the neocortical definition of death. See In re Baby K, 
16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) (entitling an anencephalic infant to 
medical treatment); In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1992) (prohibiting organ harvesting 
from an anencephalitic infant before death). One major reason to reject a neocortical defini-
tion of death is that it would entail affinnative steps to end the life of some spontaneously 
breathing human beings. See Raymond J. Devettere, Neocortical Death and Human Death, 
18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 96, 102 (1990). 
23. See John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Life, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 6, 19-
20 (John Keown ed., 1995). Harris, who subscribes to a definition of personhood identical to 
Singer's, argues that the interests of nonpersons must give way to the significant needs of 
actual persons. 
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nently insensate being and with real opportunity costs to society -
that concern can be met without denominating the vegetative pa-
tient a nonperson. I have argued elsewhere24 that permanently un-
conscious patients should be allowed to die. My rationale, 
however, is not that these patients are nonpersons, but that with-
drawal of life support in this circumstance very probably accom-
plishes the result that the patients would want. The vast majority of 
people, when asked, say that they want no life support to maintain 
them in a permanently insensate state.25 We ought to respect this 
common, and therefore putative, wish in the absence of prior in-
structions or personal indications to the contrary. Furthermore, 
even if the vegetative patient did in fact request life-sustaining 
measures, this does not mean necessarily that nonpatient sources 
must fund this care.26 
Singer might ask in return: What do we gain by calling perma-
nently unconscious beings "persons," especially if we should let 
them die anyway? I base my response on a factor that Singer 
largely ignores - namely, society's interest in sanctity-of-life, not 
as a mandate to prolong every human life, but as an injunction to 
respect the interests of human beings and humanlike beings in help-
less and vulnerable states. Sanctity-of-life in that sense centers on 
the promotion of social sensibility to the interests of humans and of 
the moral tone of society.27 From this sanctity-of-life perspective, 
human beings ought to be deemed persons with moral status re-
gardless of their intellectual capacities. 
At the very least, personhood status should not depend upon 
awareness of self over time. A societal interest in moral tone com-
pels a showing of full respect for beings with the capacity to experi-
ence human feelings and emotions.ZS Calling such beings persons 
does not mean that we must preserve them at all costs or in situa-
tions in which their own welfare or putative preferences indicate 
that they should be allowed to die.29 Acknowledging personhood 
simply implies a respect for the significant interests of such beings, 
24. See Cantor, supra note 8, at 410-17. 
25. See James Lindgren, Death by Default, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1993, at 185, 197-99. 
26. See Kristi E. Schrode, Comment, Life in Limbo: Revising Policies for Permanently 
Unconscious Patients, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1609, 1648-53 (1995). 
27. Judicial opinions have recognized that notion of sanctity-of-life. See In re Farrell, 529 
A.2d 404, 411 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-24 (N.J. 1985). 
28. For views that the capacity for feelings and interactions is sufficient for moral status 
as a person, see Daniel Callahan, Terminating Life-Sustaining Treatment of the Demented, 
HASTINGS era. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 25; Stephen G. Post, Dementia in Our Midst: The 
Moral Community, 4 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 142 (1995). 
29. For an elaboration on the appropriate criteria for allowing incompetent patients to 
die, see Part III. 
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including their autonomous choices, their human dignity,3° and 
their presumptive right to continued existence. It reverses Singer's 
ostensible indifference toward the lives and interests of those 
human beings, including neonates and profoundly incapacitated 
adults, who experience pleasure and pain despite their intellectual 
deficits. That indifference may stem from Singer's equating the in-
terests of humans and nonhuman animals. In other words, his re-
luctance to recognize a presumptive right to life for humans with 
gravely diminished mental capacity may reflect an unwillingness on 
his part to recognize a parallel right for fish and fowl (p. 222). 
B. Transition to Active Euthanasia 
Singer cannot fathom a regime of medical management of the 
dying process that permits the cessation of life-sustaining medical 
intervention but forbids the administration of lethal poisons, or ac-
tive euthanasia. For him, removal of artificial nutrition, or of any 
life-sustaining measures, constitutes the intentional taking of 
human life (p. 68). He understands that such removal is permissible 
in response to the wishes of a competent patient because of the 
patient's strong interest in shaping a dignified death and in avoiding 
suffering. Singer also understands that those same interests under-
lie any request for active euthanasia. He therefore sees a "moral 
incoherence" in forbidding active administration of death while 
permitting removal of life support (p. 80). He sees two medical ac-
tions that "are equally certain ways of bringing about the death of 
the patient" (p. 221). Indeed, active administration of a poison, 
with its immediately fatal result, seems to him more humane than a 
withdrawal of care, which creates a more protracted end-of-life 
ordeal for both the patient and her family.31 All this leads Singer to 
endorse, as part of his new ethic, physician-assisted suicide and ac-
tive euthanasia when they fulfill a suffering patient's firm wish to 
die. 
Singer sees it as anomalous to authorize some but not all actions 
that precipitate death. He mistakenly believes that the "old ethic" 
simply embodies an action-inaction dichotomy. In fact, that old 
ethic distinguishes between inaction in the face of a fatal natural 
affliction and the introduction of outside agents such as poisons or 
bullets that accelerate death. While "pulling the plug" - with-
30. "Human beings who lack or have lost the capacity for autonomous actions are none-
theless humans who retain their inherent dignity. Respect for persons comprises more than 
respect for autonomy." Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting 
Rights and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POLY. 47, 49 (1994). 
31. Singer asks: "How can it be lawful to allow a patient to die slowly, though painlessly, 
over a period of weeks from lack of food but unlawful to produce his immediate death by 
lethal injection, thereby saving his family from yet another ordeal .•. ?" P. 78. 
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drawing life support, such as a respirator - is indeed an action, it 
traditionally has been treated, so long as it merely removes a medi-
cal obstacle to a natural death, as the moral and practical equivalent 
of medical nonintervention.32 When a dying patient objects to fur-
ther medical intervention, no difference exists between failing to 
activate her respirator, failing to replenish her expired oxygen sup-
ply, or withdrawing her respirator. All these forms of medical be-
havior allow a natural dying process to run its course. 
From the outset, death-and-dying jurisprudence has regarded 
medical withdrawal of life support as equivalent to medical nonin-
tervention.33 It also has distinguished both forms of conduct -
withholding and withdrawing medical intervention - from the in-
troduction of outside lethal agents. In fact, cases upholding the pre-
rogative of a patient to reject life-sustaining treatment uniformly 
have distinguished that behavior froip. suicide on the basis of the 
distinction between letting nature take its course and initiating le-
thal agents.34 Recent cases have maintained that distinction in re-
jecting dying patients' asserted right to physician-assisted suicide. 
The Michigan Supreme Court recently commented: 
[W]hereas suicide involves an affirmative act to end a life, the refusal 
or cessation of life-sustaining medical treatment simply permits life to 
run its course, unencumbered by contrived intervention . . . . There is 
· a difference between choosing a natural death summoned by unin-
vited illness or calamity, and deliberately seeking to terminate one's 
life by resorting to death-inducing measures unrelated to the natural 
process of dying.35 
The question then becomes whether a meaningful distinction exists 
between letting nature take its course and accelerating a natural 
dying process. Singer sees the difference as perverse - noninter-
vention, as opposed to active euthanasia, tends to prolong the dying 
process and to increase the burdens on patients and their 
caretakers. 36 
32. See cases cited infra note 34. 
33. An important policy concern reinforces the willingness of courts to treat life-support 
withdrawal as equivalent to noninitiation. If medical personnel cannot remove life support, 
they would be deterred from initiating it when a patient faces a strong chance of a protracted 
existence in a dismal, deteriorated state, yet has at least a slight chance of recovery. See 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Assn., Decisions Near the End of 
Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2231 (1992) (finding "no ethical distinction between withdrawing and 
withholding life-sustaining treatment"); see also Extracts from the Report of the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 96, 105 (John Keown 
ed., 1995). 
34. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); McKay v. 
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 632 (Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985). 
35. Michigan v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728-29 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
1795 (1995). But see Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 1996 WL 94848 (9th Cir. 
1996); Quill v. Vacco, 1996 WL 148605 (3d Cir. 1996). 
36. Singer also perceives an anomaly in contemporary medical ethics' endorsement of 
analgesics that may mitigate a patient's pain but that also may accelerate her death. Again, 
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His position deprecates any societal interest in promoting sanc-
tity-of-life in the sense of maintaining respect for human existence 
in all its forms. We promote respect for human life by limiting the 
circumstances in which we permit humans to terminate human life. 
We already tolerate war, capital punishment, and self-defense. Ar-
guably, we should hesitate to add to this list, even for an object as 
appealing as the relief of suffering. Some commentators perceive a 
useful social message in drawing the dividing line between cessation 
of treatment - when disease causes the ultimate death - and eu-
thanasia - when a human act causes the patient's demise.37 Cases 
rejecting a right of people to starve themselves to death in hunger 
strikes have drawn just such a line.38 They distinguish between a 
person's decision to starve and a dying person's rejection of life-
sustaining treatment.39 Although we ultimately may come to re-
gard the distinction between allowing and precipitating death as a 
shallow psychological or symbolic anachronism,40 it surely deserves 
more than the short-shrift consideration that Singer accords it. 
Singer cannot fathom how society can permit active administration of possibly lethal outside 
agents like analgesics while proscribing active euthanasia. See p. 188. Cf. Compassion in 
Dying, 1996 WL 94848 (holding that a Washington statute prohibiting doctors from prescrib-
ing life-ending medication for the terminally ill who want to hasten their own deaths violates 
due process). 
The current legal authorization of analgesic administration, at first blush, does seem in-
consistent with a ban on euthanasia. The customary explanation - that physicians adminis-
ter analgesics with a primary intent to relieve pain - proves unpersuasive. Physicians might 
commit euthanasia with the same primary intent. A better explanation lies in the difference 
between the criminal law's authorization of some risky yet potentially beneficial acts and its 
condemnation of probably lethal conduct undertaken for the same benevolent purposes. For 
example, a surgeon may perform an operation for an important cosmetic benefit even though 
the operation poses some modest risk of death to the patient, yet he cannot perform the same 
operation if the mortal risk is very great. Along similar lines, a physician may administer an 
analgesic that is necessary to relieve pain even though the act causes some risk of death. She 
may not, however, administer a risky dosage when a smaller dosage would do, when alterna-
tive means to relieve the patient's pain exist, or when death probably will be caused. Thus, 
the tension between the authorization of risky analgesics and the prohibition on euthanasia is 
not as great as it appears. For a full account of the legalities of analgesic administration, see 
George C. Thomas & Norman L. Cantor, Pain Relief, Acceleration of Death, and Criminal 
Law, in 6 KENNEDY INST. OF ETiilcs J. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with author). 
37. See Daniel Callahan, Can We Return Death to Disease?, HASTINGS CTR. REP. Jan.-
Feb. 1989, Special Supp. at 4, 5-6; Marion Doenhoff & Reinhard Merkel, Not Compassion 
Alone: On Euthanasia and Ethics, trans. Hunter & Hildegard Hannum, HASTINGS Crn. REP. 
Special Issue 1995, at 44; Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. May-June 1993, at 32. 
38. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P .2d 375, 389 n.16 (Cal. 1993); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 
93, 97 (N.H. 1984); Van Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1982). But see Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716-17 (Ga. 1982). 
39. See also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (indi-
cating in dictum that although a dying person might have a right to reject life-sustaining 
medical intervention, a healthy person has no comparable right to starve himself to death). 
40. The distinction certainly leads to some fine line drawing. A healthy person who en-
gages in a hunger strike initiates an unnatural dying process and therefore is regarded as 
committing suicide, but if a deteriorated, fatally stricken patient makes a deliberate decision 
to stop eating, the strong medical and legal inclination is to acquiesce in the patient's fatal 
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Even if Singer is right about the shaky moral basis of the tradi-
tional line between letting die and killing, his leap to the endorse-
ment of active euthanasia seems premature. Practical concerns 
cause many bioethicists to shy away from supporting the legaliza-
tion of active euthanasia. While acknowledging that it may be mor-
ally justifiable to administer a poison to some suffering patients 
who request it, they still oppose legalization of euthanasia because 
of the perceived social hazards.41 
Their apprehensions cover a wide range. They include fear of 
outright abuse. For example, some bioethicists worry that slanted 
presentations of the choices available will taint the patients' consent 
received, or that society will use euthanasia to eliminate socially 
isolated and unwanted individuals. Their apprehensions also in-
clude more subtle hazards supposedly flowing from the availability 
of active euthanasia: pressure on fatally stricken patients to accept 
death rather than undergo expensive life-sustaining therapy; dimi-
nution of medical efforts to palliate patients' suffering; weakening 
of society's commitment to care for the dying; erosion of profes-
sional medical mores; erosion of health-care providers' morale; and 
erosion of patient confidence in the medical profession fl.owing 
from concern about physician-caused death. Although these 
hazards may prove chimerical,42 Singer's book fails to address 
them. 
One might respond to these various concerns by arguing that 
doctors rarely abuse their current role in withholding or withdraw-
ing life support. Health-care providers have ample opportunity to 
exploit gravely afflicted patients by manipulating informed consent 
leading to life-support withdrawal decisions, by administering 
analgesics with an incidental effect of accelerating death and by re-
moving life support from incompetent patients. In short, similar 
potential for abuse plagues both active euthanasia and withdrawal 
course. Of course, this may indicate only that suicide is more understandable and tolerable 
in some circumstances than in others. 
41. See Joan Teno & Joanne Lynn, Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The Individual Case and 
Public Policy, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoCY. 827 (1991). Some study commissions have taken 
the position that the s9cial hazards of authorizing active euthanasia: outweigh the potential 
benefits. See Crafting Public Policy on Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, in NEw YoRK STATE 
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS Soumrr: ASSIS"rED SUICIDE AND 
EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 117-48 (1994); Extracts from the Report of the 
House of Lords Select Committee of Medical Ethics, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED, supra note 
33, at 96. 
42. For a spirited defense of active euthanasia against these supposed dangers, see JAMES 
RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE: EUTHANASIA AND MORALITY (1986); Dan w. Brock, Volun-
tary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS CIR. REP. Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 10, 14; Stephen Newman, 
Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of • •. Time," 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 153 (1991). 
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of life support, and yet abuse has not materialized in the latter 
context.43 
I find this only partially reassuring. As I explain in Part III, the 
legal doctrine on the handling of incompetent dying patients and 
the standards for surrogate decisionmaking still are evolving. While 
medical professionals and surrogate decisionmakers have not per-
petrated abuse on helpless patient populations, this fact may be at-
tributable partially to the cautious evolution of legal standards for 
life-support removal. Those standards are still in flux and still need 
assessment. 
Furthermore, advocates of active euthanasia cannot avoid the 
difficulties associated with surrogate decisionmaking simply by in-
sisting that we confine active euthanasia to competent patients. 
Once we authorize active euthanasia, a natural impetus to extend 
its "benefits" to incompetent persons will follow. If a competent 
patient in unremitting pain would likely request and receive eutha-
nasia, a strong impulse will emerge to extend the same benefit to an 
incompetent patient in a similar condition who never provided or 
never had the capability to provide advance instructions. Experi-
ence in the Netherlands confirms the existence of this impetus.44 
Thus, proponents of active euthanasia ultimately must confront the 
issue of the standards for surrogate decisionmaking, a topic that 
Singer neglects except as to nonpersons. 
III. THE REAL ETHIC: AUTONOMY AND CONSTRUCTIVE 
PREFERENCE 
Part I showed that Singer's supposed "old ethic," which man-
dates the preservation of human life except by extraordinary 
means, never prevailed. The real ethic of death and dying has de-
veloped in American jurisprudence over the past twenty years since 
the 1976 Quinlan decision. Although some discontinuity between 
legal doctrine and medical practice persists, that jurisprudence has 
had a considerable impact on the professional standards applicable 
to end-of-life care. 
Both the relevant cases and statutes of the past twenty years 
have tended to direct medical responses to fatal conditions accord-
ing to patient preference, whether actual or putative. That 
autonomy-oriented thrust seems most evident when competent pa-
tients make contemporaneous decisions about medical intervention 
43. While many complaints are voiced about end-of-life medical practices, premature ter-
mination of life support is not one of them. See sources cited infra note 82. 
44. Euthanasia has been performed there upon gravely incapacitated infants. See CAR· 
LOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATII: EUTIIANASIA AND TIIE CASE OF TIIE NETIIERLANDS, 
83-85 (1991}; Maurice A.M. de Wachter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, HASTINGS Crn. REP. 
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 23, 24. 
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or when they have left advance instructions for their post-compe-
tence care. Yet, even when the now-incompetent patient never pre-
pared such instructions, what I call constructive preference - a 
notion grounded in autonomy and respect for human dignity -
emerges as the principal legal guide to the patient's medical fate. 
The construction of preference requires a decisionmaker to project 
what the now-incompetent patient would want done. I call this ap-
proach constructive preference because it seeks to replicate a now-
incompetent patient's likely preference in the absence of actual pa-
tient choice. The surrogate's decision inevitably must be construc-
tive, but, as subsequent discussion will indicate, that decision need 
not be disconnected from the patient's wishes. 
An autonomy-constructive preference ethic does in fact under-
lie the current jurisprudence. Legal doctrine governing end-of-life 
medical care starts with the competent patient. American courts 
uniformly uphold the prerogative of competent patients to reject 
life-sustaining medical intervention.45 In so doing, they look to the 
doctrine of informed consent, a doctrine based on notions of bodily 
integi;ity and self-determination that rest, in tum, on respect for 
human dignity and capacity for choice.46 Thus, as to competent 
medical patients, a close relation exists between autonomy and dig-
nity. The primacy of autonomy extends to "prospective autonomy" 
- a competent person's right to shape her post-competence medi-
cal treatment by advance instructions. Numerous cases have 
looked to such instructions as the key determinant in surrogate 
decisionmaking.47 
Legislatures also respect prospective autonomy. All fifty states 
accord statutory protection for som~ form of advance medical di-
rective. 48 Living will and advance directive laws, for example, give 
legal effect to the advance instructions of now-incompetent pa-
tients.49 Durable-power-of-attorney laws allow people to designate 
45. See Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); State v. 
McAffee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); In re 
Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987). 
46. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 142-46; GERALD DWORKIN, THE 
THEORY AND PRAcnCE OF AUTONOMY (1988) . 
. 47 .. Some cases see prospective autonomy as grounded in the competent patient's consti-
tutional right to reject medical intervention. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 586 
(D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987). Other cases uphold 
prospective autonomy as an extension of a patient's common-law prerogative to make per-
sonal medical decisions. See In re Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 853 n.20 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1989); In re 
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 951-52 (Me. 1987). 
48. See SOCIETY FOR TiiE RIGHI" TO DIE, REFUSAL OF TREATMENT LEGISLATION: A 
STATE BY STATE CoMPILATION OF ENACTED AND MODEL STATUTES (1991). 
49. See David Orentlicher, The Limits of Legislation, 53 Mo. L. REV. 1255, 1258-59 
(1994). 
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health-care agents to implement their advance instructions.50 The 
apparent object of these legal sources - both judicial and legisla-
tive - is to respect self-determination in shaping one's own dying 
process.51 
Some commentators challenge the notion of prospective auton-
omy.52 They question the validity of choices made well in advance 
of incapacity and perhaps without a full understanding of and delib-
eration over the range of possible medical conditions and outcomes: 
They also contend that the interests that shape a declarant's ad-
vance instructions - in avoiding indignity, in avoiding the frustra-
tion of helplessness and debilitation, and in sparing loved ones from 
emotional and financial burdens - become largely irrelevant once 
incompetent patients no longer can appreciate violations of their 
prior choices. · 
Nonetheless, the overwhelming weight of judicial and legislative 
sentiment endorses prospective autonomy. The explanation is sim-
ple and understandable. People have a strong interest in shaping 
their own version of a dignified dying process regardless of whether 
they actually experience the feared degradation. Many adults have 
witnessed the demise of a loved one and can envision a level of 
debilitation that they deem intolerably undignified. People care 
about their lifetime image, which includes the memories left behind 
during the dying process.53 They wish to imprint their values -
whether grounded in religion, a personal vision of dignity, or solici-
tude toward loved ones - on their end-of-life story. Prospective 
autonomy therefore protects important interests in self-definition 
and self-determination.s4 
Even if prospective autonomy is a meaningful concept, what 
about the incompetent person who never articulated her choices? 
Her surrogate's decision cannot invoke genuine autonomy - genu-
50. Id. at 1259-60. 
51. "The principle of respect for persons, which supports respect for the autonomous 
patient's choices, also supports reliance on the nonautonomous person's prior autonomous 
directives." James F. Childress, Dying Patients: Who's in Control?, 11 LAw MED. & HEALTII 
CARE 227, 228 (1989). 
52. See Dan W. Brock, Trumping Advance Directives, HASTINGS Cra. REP. Sept.-Oct. 
1991, Special Supp., at SS; Rebecca S. Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incom-
petent Patients, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 609 (1994); Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, 
Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the 
Orthodox Approach, 17 LAW MED. & HEALTII CARE 234, 236-38 (1989); John A. Robertson, 
Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients, 25 
GA. L. REV. 1139, 1159, 1180-81 (1991). 
53. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343-44, 356 (1990) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 201-17 (1993); Harris, supra 
note 23, at 6, 14. 
54. For a more elaborate defense of prospective autonomy and discussion of its bounds, 
see NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIREcnVES AND TIIE PURSUIT OF DEATII WITII 
DIGNITY 23-32, 122-34 (1993). 
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ine autonomy demands a personalized weighing of medical options 
in light of personal values and preferences.ss Nonetheless, the ap-
plicable legal norms in this context recognize a close relation be-
tween patient choice and surrogate decisionmaking. Both of the 
common standards governing decisionmaking on behalf of formerly 
competent patients - "substituted judgment" and "best interests" 
- display strong preoccupation with the patient's putative desires 
even when she never prepared advance instructions. 
The substituted-judgment standard seeks to reach the same de-
cision that the patient would reach if competent and cognizant of 
the circumstances. That objective - seeking to project and repli-
cate what the patient would want - reflects the law's pervasive 
interest in respecting personal choice. Actual patient choice is im-
possible in the absence of prior instructions; however, the substi-
tuted-judgment approach serves the patient-choice goal by 
examining the patient's personal value system, including her "philo-
sophical, religious and moral views, life goals, values about the pur-
pose of life and the way [life] should be lived, and attitudes toward 
... suffering and death."S6 Some versions of substituted judgment 
authorize a surrogate decisionmaker to use such data in order to 
make a best approximation of what the patient would want, if 
competent.s7 
The substituted-judgment standard thus seeks to treat the for-
merly competent patient as an individual with moral dignity whose 
putative preferences matter.ss By allowing a surrogate to consider 
a range of possible dispositions, from vigorous medical intervention 
to merely palliative care, it preserves the same range of options that 
would be available to a competent patient. In so doing, the substi-
tuted-judgment approach underlines the equivalence in stature be-
tween the now-incompetent person and her former competent self. 
Also, by striving to discern her likely wishes, the formula seeks to 
preserve the autonomy rights that the formerly competent patient 
no longer can exercise.s9 
55. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985). 
56. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299-300 (III. 1989). 
57. See Matter of Tave!, 661A.2d1061, 1068-69 (Del. 1995); Longeway, 549 N.E.2d at 
299-300; Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 497 N.E.2d 626, 631-32 (Mass. 1986); In re 
Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 456-57 (Wash. 1987); In re 
Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983). 
58. See John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judge-
ment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 63 (1976). 
59. Notice how two of the earliest decisions involving incompetent patients stressed the 
goal of preserving a competent patient's right to choose: "The only practical way to prevent 
destruction of the right [to reject treatment] is to permit the guardian and family of Karen to 
render their best judgment ... as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances." 
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The Saikewicz court 
noted: 
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The problem with the substituted-judgment standard lies in its 
administration, especially in the absence of prior, considered in-
structions. Reliance on value-related or character-related data 
about the patient may engender uncertainty about what the patient 
would have wanted, if competent. To be sure, certain personal val-
ues may provide conclusive evidence of the patient's preferences. 
For example, a surrogate for a devout orthodox Jew or Roman 
Catholic who always has subscribed to her denomination's religious 
precepts safely can ascribe that denomination's well-developed po-
sitions regarding terminal care to the patient. Many factors com-
monly invoked to guide a surrogate under the substituted-judgment 
standard, however - such as the patient's prior attitude toward 
doctors, general lifestyle, and solicitude for the interests of close 
family - simply cannot identify the point of decline at which the 
patient would prefer death to continued existence.60 Reliance on a 
patient's general value system, as part of a "best approximation" 
method for determining the patient's wishes, has prompted substan-
tial criticism. The critics point to studies that indicate that a signifi-
cant discrepancy exists between the wishes of seriously ill patients 
and the beliefs of their relatives as to what the patients would 
want.61 At best, these data suggest that some disjunction may lie 
between the surrogate's definition of the patient's wishes and the 
patient's actual, though unexpressed, wishes. At worst, they indi-
cate that general value system or lifestyle indicia of patients' wishes 
leave room for surrogates to impose their own values and predispo-
sitions on patients. 62 The ultimate specter is that surrogates, under 
the guise of the putative wishes of the patient, will make biased or 
self-interested determinations. 
We think that principles of equality and respect for all Individuals require the conclusion 
that a choice exists ...• [W]e recognize a general right in all persons to refuse medical 
treatment in appropriate circumstances. The recognition of that right must extend to the 
case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human 
dignity extends to both. 
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (Mass. 1977). 
60. See Bernard Lo, Caring for Incompetent Patients: Is There a Physician on the Case?, 
17 LAw MED. & HEALTII CARE 214, 215-17 (1989); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and 
Death, 102 HARV. L. REv. 375, 390-91 (1988). 
61. See Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Decisions at the End of Life: Guided by 
Communities of Patients, HASTINGS Crn. REP. Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 6-7; Jeremiah Suh! et al., 
Myth of Substituted Judgement: Surrogate Decision Making Regarding Life Support is Unreli-
able, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MEo. 93-94 (1994); Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians' 
and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY 
115, 120 (1988); Nancy Zweibel & Christine Cassell, Treatment Choices at the End of Life, 29 
GERONTOLOGIST 615, 618 (1989). See also sources cited in Kathryn A. Koch et al., Analysis 
of Power in Medical Decision-Making: An Argument for Physician Autonomy, 20 LAW MED. 
& HEALTII CARE 320, 323 n.11 (1992). 
62. See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 52, at 235; Lo, supra note 60, at 216; Tracy L. 
Merritt, Equality for the Elderly Incompetent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 689, 709, 714 (1987); Rhoden, 
supra note 60, at 387. 
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The solution, however, is not to abandon the substituted-
judgment standard's focus on putative patient wishes. Rather, it is 
to guard against excessive surrogate subjectivity by formulating de-
fault norms to guide and circumscribe surrogate decisionmaking.63 
Beside substituted judgment, the other major standard for sur-
rogate decisionmakers is the "best interests of the patient."64 
Under one version of best interests, the surrogate seeks to assess 
the objective well-being of the now-incompetent patient and main-
tains life support unless the prospective burdens· on the patient -
primarily pain and suffering - appear to outweigh the benefits -
pleasure and satisfaction.65 A best-interests formula, however, can 
and usually does encompass more than just the observable emo-
tions of the patient. 
In its own fashion, a best-interests standard impels the surrogate 
to effectuate what the now-incompetent patient would have 
wanted, if competent. In the absence of proof about the patient's 
actual wishes, the best-interests standard assumes that the patient 
would want the same treatment that the average person in the same 
circumstances would want. It defines patient well-being - the key 
to best interests - according to understandings about the average 
person's definition of well-being.66 Extreme suffering, for example, 
is regarded as an integral ingredient of best interests because the 
vast majority of people are averse to extreme suffering. Quality of 
life, often addressed under the rubric of patient dignity, frequently 
forms an element of best interests because the average person ties 
the two together.67 The hope is to implement the patient's likely 
63. For elaboration on this idea, see infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. 
64. Many view the two standards - substituted judgment and best interests - as part of 
a continuum. The surrogate starts with substituted judgment and seeks to ascertain what the 
patient would have wanted by considering prior expressions and other indicia. When those 
indicia prove indeterminative, the surrogate attempts to define the best interests of the pa-
tient. See Phillip G. Peters, Jr., The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan 
to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 891, 922-23 (1989); Stewart G. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: 
Who Makes Them and By What Standards, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 518-22 (1989); Robert 
M. Veatch, Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment: Limits to the Consensus, 3 KENNEDY INST. 
OF ETHICS J. 1 (1993). 
65. See Dresser, supra note 52, at 657 n.2, 711; Rhoden, supra note 60, at 398-99. 
66. See NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAw, WHEN Onnms MusT 
CHOOSE 55-56 (1992); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT 136 (1983). Dan W. Brock contends that best interests "amounts to asking how 
most reasonable persons would decide jn these circumstances." Dan W. Brock, Surrogate 
Decision Making for Incompetent Adults: An Ethical Framework, 58 MouNT SINAI J. MED. 
388 (1991). 
67. See NEW YoRK STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 41, at 77-113 (arguing that life sup-
port seems excessively burdensome for a "patient who would have viewed continued treat-
ment as an affront to his or her dignity"); see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, 
at 219. Clinical protocols - guidelines for end-of-life care prepared by professional organi-
zations - often include quality of life as an element of best interests. See AM. MEDICAL 
ASSN., CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, § 2.16; 
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choice by having the surrogate use the same criteria and weighting 
of factors that most people would choose for themselves. 68 The 
best-interests and substituted-judgment approaches thus have a 
common objective - replication of what the individual patient 
likely would want regarding end-of-life care.69 
While the best-interests and substituted-judgment formulae 
share a common ethic, they also share common difficulties. Both 
raise the same kinds of concerns - indeterminacy and potential 
subjectivity in surrogate decisionmaking. For example, to the ex-
tent that the best-interests standard considers suffering as a key ele-
ment, discerning the experiential reality of gravely demented 
patients seems a daunting, if not impossible, task.70 Indeed, severe 
problems of measurement plague any surrogate seeking to deter-
mine an incompetent's level of suffering or to compare her levels of 
suffering and satisfaction. Likewise, imprecision nags at any 
quality-of-life determination as an ingredient of best interests . 
. Some commentators dismiss quality of life - or indignity - as a 
subjective, value-laden notion that lacks consistency and falls prey 
to surrogates' biases regarding a minimally tolerable quality of 
1!-1' 71 llJ.e. 
In sum, the jurisprudence of surrogate decisionmaking strives to 
implement the actual or putative wishes of incompetent patients. 
Yet if we really want to implement those wishes, we must overcome 
Los ANGELES CouNTY MEDICAL AssN. & Los ANGELES CouNTY BAR AssN. Jo1NT CoM-
MITI"EE ON BIOMEDICAL ETiiICS, FORGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT FOR ADULT 
PATIENTS: PATIENTS WITHOUT DECISION MAKING CAPACITY WHO LACK SURROGATES 3 
(1993); John M. Stanley et al., The Appleton Consensus: Suggested International Guidelines 
for Decisions to Forego Medical Treatment, 15 J. MED. ETiiics 129, 131 {1989). 
68. See THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING 
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 28 {1987). 
69. The two standards do not ignore the actual preferences of the particular patient. The 
substituted-judgment standard examines them before turning to a best-interests approach, 
and the best-interests formula often consults the patient's discernible values and preferences 
in defining her best interests. 
70. "The real burdens and benefits of life in extremely debilitating circumstances are 
often beyond our ability to know confidently or comprehend fully." Peters, supra note 64, at 
942. For a comprehensive examination of this issue, and one urging greater efforts to discern 
the murky reality in question, see Dresser, supra note 52, at 666-91. Beside Professor 
Dresser, many other commentators have noted the intrinsic difficulty in measuring the bur-
dens and benefits of a severely demented patient. See John Arras, The Severely Demented, 
Minimally Functional Patient: An Ethical Analysis, 36 J. AM. GERIATRIC Socv. 938 {1988); 
Rhoden, supra note 60, at 404-05; Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. 
L. REV. 845, 847-50 {1990); see also In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 424-25 (N.J. 1987). 
71. See Lo, supra note 60, at 216-17; D. Don Welch, Walking in Their Shoes: Paying 
Respect to Incompetent Patients, 42 V AND. L. REv. 1617, 1636-37 {1989); Developments in the 
Law - Medical Technology and the Law, Section IV: The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1652-53 {1990); cf. Yale Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional 
"Right to Die"? When is There No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203, 1241 
{1991) (recognizing the subjective biases involved in decisions to terminate life-sustaining 
treatment). 
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the imprecision and subjectivity inherent in concepts such as intol-
erable indignity or quality of life.72 This is essential because any 
effective surrogate decisionmaking standard must reassure compe-
tent persons that their post-competence care will conform to their 
desires and expectations. Unless we achieve a common under-
standing of intolerable indignity, for example, a decisionmaking 
standard that incorporates that element will engender anxiety 
rather than reassurance. We need, therefore, reliable guidelines 
about levels of intolerable indignity to serve as a check on arbitrari-
ness and abuse in surrogate decisionmaking. 
I use the term "constructive preference" to denote an approach 
that surrogates may employ when making end-of-life medical deci-
sions for formerly competent patients who left no instructions.73 
The object - as with much of substituted-judgment and best-
interests doctrine - is to provide the medical care that the now-
incompetent patient would have chosen if she had considered the 
issue while competent. Because the patient never exercised her 
prospective autonomy prerogative or provided definitive guidance 
with regard to her end-of-life treatment, the surrogate will do her 
best to determine what most people would want in the same cir-
cumstances and to treat the patient acc.ordingly.74 As Nancy 
Rhoden argues, acting on a patient's "probable desires can be 
equated with implementing the patient's right of choice. "75 
Constructive preference rests on the premise that most people 
want to avoid extreme indignity in their own post-competence dy-
ing processes. Constructive preference also assumes that wide-
spread accord exists about intolerable levels of debilitation in the 
dying process, and that this accord will allow for some default 
72. Sanford H. Kadish comments: 
How much ability to sense and take comfort from experiences is required before we can 
say [a debilitated patient's] life is not worth living? At bottom, the difficulty is that we 
have no way to make confident judgments about how far cognitive and physical deterio-
ration must go before life ceases to be worth living, because the value judgments implicit 
in such a conclusion are in sharp contention in our society. 
Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REv. 857, 
882 (1992). 
Rebecca S. Dresser also cites the "highly disparate meanings" dignity can have for differ-
ent people. Rebecca S. Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmi-
ties and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 Aruz. L. REv. 373, 387 (1986). 
73. I engage in a much longer and more detailed discussion of constructive preference in 
Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a Construc-
tive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance Instruc-
tions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with author). 
74. Under the prevailing autonomy ethic, a patient's actual preferences, when discerni-
ble, should govern. Therefore, constructive preference provides a fallback when a patient's 
history and values provide no definitive guidance to her surrogate. 
75. Rhoden, supra note 60, at 384. 
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guides.76 Of course, the array of circumstances that confront dying 
patients is enormous and not every patient's situation can be re-
solved by resort to widespread accord or consensus. At least for 
some commonly confronted circumstances, though, surrogates may 
find guidance in people's widely shared predilections about intoler-
able levels of debilitation. 
Permanent unconsciousness provides the best example of con-
sensus sufficient to trigger constructive preference. Surveys consist-
ently show that the vast majority of people would not wish to have 
life support to maintain them in a permanently unconscious state.77 
Given this, a surrogate should be required to authorize the cessa-
tion of life support for a permanently unconscious patient absent 
significant evidence that the patient's views deviate from the com-
mon preference.78 
The constructive-preference approach raises many issues: How 
can we measure common preferences about indignity, given the 
multitude of potential death-and-dying circumstances? Whose 
preferences should matter in establishing a norm? What impact 
upon a surrogate's choice should fl.ow from the fact that x or y per-
centage of people deem a particular status intolerably undignified 
for their own future fates? 
I address only the first question here. As to data sources, peo-
ple's preferences regarding post-competence medical care can be 
gleaned from surveys and from bulk analysis of advance medical 
directives.79 While some advance directives seem cursory and unin-
formative, others spell out clear visions of intolerable indignity in 
the dying process.80 Also, although surveys cannot anticipate the 
76. Several commentators recognize the need for default positions, grounded on under-
standings about what most people would want for themselves, to guide decisions on behalf of 
incompetent patients who have not left sufficient indicia of their personal preferences. See 
James F. Drane & John L. Coulehan, The Best-Interest Standard: Surrogate Decision Making 
and Quality of Life, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 20, 24-26, 29 (1995); James Lindgren, Death by 
Default, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 1993, at 185, 186, 195, 199, 228-29; Carl E. Schneider, 
From Consumer Choice to Consumer Welfare, HASTINGS Cm. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, Special 
Supp., at S25, S27 (urging default positions for patients based on "what we think they would 
want if they thought about it"). 
77. See, e.g., Lindgren, supra note 76, at 231. 
78. Other commentators favor this kind of a presumption in the case of permanently 
unconscious patients. See Marcia Angell, After Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vege-
tative State, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1524 (1994); Michele Yeun, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting 
New Standards for Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L. REV. 581, 623 (1992); Schrode, 
supra note 26; Bernard D. Davis, Right to Die: Living Wills are Inadequate, WALL ST. J., July 
31, 1990, at A12. 
79. See Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 61, at 6; Lindgren, supra note 76. 
80. See Norman L. Cantor, My Annotated Living Will, 18 LAw MED. & HEALTII CARE 
114 (1990). Some advance directives utilize values histories or values profiles to provide 
guidance about intolerable levels of debilitation. See CANTOR, supra note 54, at 166-70; 
Ezekiel Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Living Wills: Past, Present, and Future, 6 J. CLIN. 
ETHICS 9, 15-16 (1990); Linda L. Emanuel, Structured Deliberation to Improve Decisionmak-
ing for the Seriously Ill, HASTINGS Cm. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, Special Supp., at S14; Pam 
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multitude of circumstances that will confront incompetent patients, 
they can utilize scenarios that reflect a range of commonly occur-
ring conditions in the dying process.81 
Constructive preference assumes, in the end, that default pre-
sumptions can be anchored in objectively measurable data about 
the level of mental and physical debilitation that most people con-
sider intolerably undignified and therefore unacceptable. It as-
sumes that we can establish guidelines or presumptions for certain 
commonly occurring conditions. When a large majority of people 
would prefer withdrawal of life support, a surrogate should imple-
ment the popular preference and withdraw life support, unless sig-
nificant indicia in the particular patient's history indicate that the 
patient would prefer otherwise. Default principles would have to 
receive wide publicity, so that any person whose preferences dif-
fered from the default position could issue advance instructions and 
avoid imposition of constructive preference. By focusing on what 
competent people commonly choose and reject, constructive prefer-
ence discourages resort to surrogates' subjective visions about 
which lives are worth preserving or to any government-formulated 
view of minimally acceptable dignity. Moreover, by following a 
course that the majority of people would choose -·that is, imple-
menting the course that the now-incompetent patient would likely 
have chosen - constructive preference comes as close as possible 
to fulfilling the wishes of people who have never communicated 
their wishes or left other meaningful indicia of their preferences for 
end-of-life medical intervention. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to what Singer suggests, an ethic already exists in the 
context of death-and-dying that does not adopt a maximum exten-
sion-of-life principle. The, ethic that permeates the past twenty 
years of jurisprudence places primacy on autonomy - both con-
temporaneous and prospective - and on constructive preference 
when a patient's actual preference cannot be determined. The con-
temporary ethic recognizes quality-of-life distinctions that are 
grounded in competent persons' choices regarding intolerable in-
Lambert et al., The Values History: An Innovation in Surrogate Medical Decision-Making, 18 
LAW MED. & HEALTii CARE 202 (1990); Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Relationship of 
General Advance Directive Instructions to Specific Life-Sustaining Treatment Preferences, 152 
ARCHIVES INT. MED. 2114, 2117-18 (1992). 
81. See, e.g., Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care - A Case for 
Greater Use, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889 (1991); Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel Emanuel, The 
Medical Directive, 261 JAMA 3288 (1989); Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 61, at 6. Both 
scenarios and values profiles - documents asking people to identify elements of personally 
intolerable indignity - will permit us to learn about common attitudes toward end-of-life 
care. 
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dignity in the dying process or in surrogates' choices based on un-
derstandings of what most people would wish in similar 
circumstances. The challenge is not, as Singer claims, to propound 
a radically new ethic - although he may be right that active eutha-
nasia ultimately will be added as an available option. Rather, the 
challenge is to translate the extant theory into practice. For in 
American institutions the sad reality continues to be that the dying 
process often is not what patients want - or would have wanted.82 
82. A large recent study seems to indicate that the dying process in many hospitals still is 
characterized by absence of communication between patients or surrogates and caregivers, 
misunderstanding about the wishes of the patient, and over-commitment to aggressive inter-
vention. See The Study to Understand Prognosis and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of 
Treatment (SUPPORT), A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized 
Patients, 274 JAMA 1591 (1995). For reactions to this study and suggestions about how to 
conform customary practice to ethical theory, see Bernard Lo, Improving Care Near the End 
of Life: Why ls It So Hard?, 274 JAMA 1634 (1995); Dying Well in the Hospital: The Les-
sons of SUPPORT, HASTINGS Crn. REP. Nov.-Dec. 1995, Special Supp., at Sl-S36. 
